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Abstract
When one wants to draw non-trivial inferences
from an inconsistent belief base, a very natural ap-
proach is to take advantage of the maximal consis-
tent subsets of the base. But few inference rela-
tions from maximal consistent subsets exist. In this
paper we point out new inference relations based
on selection of some maximal consistent subsets,
leading thus to inference relations with a stronger
inferential power. The selection process must obey
some principles to ensure that it leads to an infer-
ence relation which is rational. We define a general
class of monotonic selection relations for compar-
ing maximal consistent subsets and show that it cor-
responds to the class of rational inference relations.
1 Introduction
A very natural approach to draw plausible conclusions from
an inconsistent belief base amounts to taking advantage of
the maximal (for set inclusion) consistent subsets of the base
(see e.g., [Rescher and Manor, 1970]). Quite surprisingly,
very few inference mechanisms exist for defining an infer-
ence relation that is based on those subsets. Indeed, to the best
of our knowledge, only three mechanisms have been identi-
fied so far in the literature (see e.g., [Pinkas and Loui, 1991;
Benferhat et al., 1997]:
• skeptical inference, where a formula is a consequence
of the base if it is implied by each maximal consistent
subset,
• credulous inference, where a formula is a consequence
of the base if it is implied by at least one maximal con-
sistent subset,
• argumentative inference, where a formula is a conse-
quence of the base if it is implied by at least one maximal
consistent subset and its negation is not.
However, the credulous and the argumentative mechanisms
are not satisfactory since they do not induce so-called prefer-
ential inference relations, i.e., they miss to satisfy some ex-
pected postulates for inference relations [Kraus et al., 1990].
Worse than that, credulous inference does not lead to jointly
consistent conclusions since for inconsistent bases, it may be
possible to infer credulously both a formula and its negation.
Accordingly, the only fully rational choice identified in the
literature is skeptical inference: it is the only inference mech-
anism that leads to preferential inference relations [Kraus et
al., 1990]. The basic inference relation based on the skepti-
cal inference mechanism considers every maximal consistent
subset of the base. A well-known refinement of this relation
consists in focusing on the largest maximal consistent subsets
of the base. This relation is known to be rational [Benferhat
et al., 1993].
The main question we want to address in this paper is to
determine whether other refinements of the basic inference
relation satisfying the expected postulates for nonmonotonic
inference exist, and if the answer is positive, to characterize
some of them. This is important because the inferential power
of the inference relation based on all (or only the largest)
maximal consistent subsets is sometimes very weak, as illus-
trated by the following example.
Consider a scenario where a belief base is made by putting
together in a common repository some pieces of information,
issued from several sources which are equally reliable, and
represented by propositional formulae. Suppose also that
the origins of the pieces of information (e.g., the sources
they come from) are unknown or have been lost. This is a
common assumption underlying for instance the AGM set-
ting for belief revision, where it is supposed as well that one
cannot trace back the pieces of beliefs [Ga¨rdenfors, 1988;
Ga¨rdenfors, 1992]. In such a case, one cannot take advan-
tage of them to make a selection of the subsets, as done for
instance in belief merging [Konieczny, 2000; Konieczny and
Pe´rez, 2002; Konieczny and Pe´rez, 2011]. For the sake of
illustration, suppose that the (contradictory) pieces of infor-
mation that were gathered concern an incoming model of car
from our favorite brand (those pieces of information have
been obtained through different sources, like car magazines,
websites, friends, etc.). The first piece of information is that
the new car has a 6-cylinder engine: ϕ1 = e6c. The sec-
ond piece of information is that it has a manual gearbox:
ϕ2 = mg. The third one is that it has a turbo (t) and
that a car that has a 6-cylinder engine is a not a sport car:
ϕ3 = t ∧ (e6c → ¬sc). The fourth one is that the car
has a low fuel consumption (lc) and does not have a man-
ual gearbox: ϕ4 = lc ∧ ¬mg. The fifth one is that it is a
sport car (sc), that does not have a manual gearbox and that a
sport car does not have a low fuel consumption, and that a car
with a 6-cylinder engine does not have 4-wheel drive (wd4):
ϕ5 = sc ∧ ¬mg ∧ (sc → ¬lc) ∧ (e6c → ¬wd4). The last
one is that the car has 4-wheel drive, does not have a manual
gearbox, and that cars with 4-wheel drive do not have a low
fuel consumption, and that cars with 6-cylinder engine do not
need a turbo: ϕ6 = wd4∧¬mg∧(wd4→ ¬lc)∧(e6c→ ¬t).
To sum up, the belief base is K = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕ6} where:
ϕ1 = e6c ϕ2 = mg
ϕ3 = t ∧ (e6c→ ¬sc) ϕ4 = lc ∧ ¬mg
ϕ5 = sc ∧ ¬mg ∧ (sc→ ¬lc) ∧ (e6c→ ¬wd4)
ϕ6 = wd4 ∧ ¬mg ∧ (wd4→ ¬lc) ∧ (e6c→ ¬t)
It can be easily checked that K has 5 maximal consistent
subsets, namely: K1 = {ϕ1, ϕ6}, K2 = {ϕ1, ϕ5}, K3 = {ϕ1,
ϕ2, ϕ3}, K4 = {ϕ1, ϕ3, ϕ4}, K5 = {ϕ3, ϕ5, ϕ6}.
Using skeptical inference from all these maximal consis-
tent subsets, none of the six formulae in K can be derived as
a conclusion. This means that whenever the formula ϕi (with
i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}), there exists a maximal consistent subset Kj
(j ∈ {1, . . . , 5}) of K such that Kj |= ¬ϕi. Similarly, only ϕ3
can be derived from K provided that the largest maximal con-
sistent subsets of K (here, K3, K4, and K5) are considered. As
a consequence, only very weak conclusions composed of dis-
junctions of those formulae can be obtained as consequences.
However, all the incoming pieces of information ϕi do not
play symmetric role with respect to the maximal consistent
subsets Kj . Consider for instance ϕ1 and ϕ2: we have that ϕ1
is a logical consequence of 4 (over 5) maximal consistent sub-
sets of K, while ϕ2 is a logical consequence of only one of
them. Since the global inconsistency of a belief base is often
due to the presence in it of erroneous pieces of information,
it makes sense to take advantage of this discrepancy to con-
sider some pieces of information as more reliable than others
because they are more consensual / less conflicting with the
other pieces of information which have been reported.
In the following a new family of inference relations from
maximal consistent subsets is presented. The key idea under-
lying them is to select some of the maximal consistent sub-
sets of the base. This allows us to define inference relations
with a stronger inferential power than the standard inference
relation focusing on the consequences of all maximal con-
sistent subsets. However, making the selection process arbi-
trary does not guarantee that the resulting inference relation is
preferential, which is expected. Some principles are needed.
In this direction, we define a general class of monotonic se-
lection relations for comparing maximal consistent subsets.
We provide several examples of inference relations from this
class. We show that, whenever a monotonic selection relation
is used to select the best maximal consistent subsets, the in-
duced inference relation is preferential. Furthermore, it also
satisfies rational monotony, i.e., it is a rational inference rela-
tion in the sense of [Lehmann and Magidor, 1992]. More than
that, we provide a representation theorem showing that the
class of rational inference relations of [Lehmann and Magi-
dor, 1992] coincides with the class of skeptical inference re-
lations from selected maximal consistent subsets, where the
selection process is achieved using a monotonic selection re-
lation.
2 Preliminaries
Our formal setting is classical propositional logic. Thus we
consider a language L defined from a finite set V of propo-
sitional variables and the usual connectives. The elements of
L are called formulae. An interpretation m is a mapping that
assigns a truth value to every variable of V . We denote the
set of interpretations of propositional logic by Mod(L). For a
formula α and an interpretation m ∈ Mod(L), m is a model
of α, denoted m |= α if α is true in m. For a formula α, we
denote by Mod(α) the set of its models. We say that a model
m is a model of a set of formulae S and write m |= S if for
every formula α ∈ S, we have m |= α. For two formulae α,
β, we write α |= β if every model of α is a model of β. For a
set of formulae S and a formula α, we write S |= α if every
model of S is a model of α. Given a set of formulae S, we
denote Cn(S) = {α ∈ L | S |= α}, the set of consequences
of S. We say that a set S is consistent if and only if it has at
least one model. We say that a formula α is consistent if and
only if the set {α} is consistent, and that α is a trivial formula
if and only if α ≡ > or α ≡ ⊥.
Definition 1 (Belief base). A belief base is a finite set of for-
mulae.
Standard notions when facing inconsistent belief bases are
minimal inconsistent subsets, that encode the sources of con-
flicts in the base; and maximal consistent subsets, which can
be considered as the potential repairs of the inconsistent be-
lief base.
Definition 2 (mc). mc is a mapping defined as follows: for
every belief base K, mc(K) is the set of all maximal (for set
inclusion) consistent subsets of K:
• K′ ⊆ K
• K′ is consistent
• If K′ ⊂ K′′ ⊆ K, then K′′ is not consistent
Definition 3 (mus). mus is a mapping defined as follows: for
every belief base K, mus(K) is the set of all minimal (for set
inclusion) inconsistent subsets of K:
• K′ ⊆ K
• K′ is not consistent
• If K′′ ⊂ K′, then K′′ is consistent
3 Inference from Selected Maximal
Consistent Subsets
Our main objective is to identify selection criteria on maxi-
mal consistent subsets, leading to minimize information loss
from the belief base while guaranteeing that the induced in-
ference relations are rational ones in the sense of [Lehmann
and Magidor, 1992]. One already knows that such criteria ex-
ist, since the inference relation based on the largest maximal
consistent subsets of K is rational [Benferhat et al., 1993],
but we would like to identify other inference schemata and
more general conditions on the set of all maximal consistent
subsets which are sufficient to ensure that the corresponding
inference relations are rational. To this end, we introduce new
inference relations based on a selection of the maximal con-
sistent subsets of K maximizing a given scoring function.
We will first define mappings that attach a score to each
formula α of K and then aggregate those scores (in the follow-
ing, we will simply sum up the scores; as will be discussed
later, other aggregation functions could be considered alter-
natively).
Definition 4 (scoring function). A scoring function s asso-
ciates with a belief base K and a formula α ∈ K a non-
negative real number s(K, α) which is equal to 0 if and only
if α is a trivial formula (i.e., such that α ≡ > or α ≡ ⊥).
Here are some examples of scoring functions. The first one
is based on the number of maximal consistent sets a formula
belongs to.
Definition 5 (#mc). Let K be a belief base and α ∈ K. We
define:
#mc(K, α) =
{
0 if α is trivial
|{Ki ∈ mc(K) | α ∈ Ki}| otherwise
Another interesting example of a scoring function is based
on the number of minimal inconsistent sets a formula belongs
to. The scale must be reversed here, since this number must
be minimized if one wants to give some preference to the less
conflicting formulae. The addition of 1 in the second part of
the definition is introduced in order to make sure that only
trivial formulae can get the score 0.
Definition 6 (#mus). Let K be a belief base and α ∈ K. We
define:
#mus(K, α) =

0 if α is trivial, otherwise
1 + |mus(K)|−
|{Ki ⊆ K | Ki ∈ mus(K), α ∈ Ki}|
We could also use an inconsistency measure in order to at-
tach scores to formulae. Let us consider the measure MIV ,
introduced by Hunter and Konieczny (2006; 2010), which is
based both on the number of minimal inconsistent subsets
containing a formula and on their cardinalities. The idea is
that belonging to a large inconsistent set puts less blame on a
formula than belonging to a small set.
Definition 7 (MIV). Let K be a belief base and α ∈ K. We
define:
MIVK(α) =
∑
M∈mus(K),α∈M
1
|M |
We can use MIV to define a scoring function miv as follows:
Definition 8 (miv). Let K be a belief base and α ∈ K. We
define maxmiv(K) = maxα∈KMIVK(α) and
miv(K, α) =
{
0 if α trivial
1 + maxmiv(K)− MIVK(α) otherwise
On this ground, the score of any subset of K can be com-
puted by aggregating (e.g., using sum) the scores of its ele-
ments:
Definition 9 (scoresK,sum). Let s be a scoring function. Let
K be a belief base, and let Ki ⊆ K. We note scoresK,sum(Ki) =∑
α∈Ki s(K, α).
Especially, we have:
score
#mc
K,sum(Ki) =
∑
α∈Ki
#mc(K, α).
score
#mus
K,sum(Ki) =
∑
α∈Ki
#mus(K, α).
scoremivK,sum(Ki) =
∑
α∈Ki
miv(K, α).
The reader may observe that score#mcK,sum was the scoring
function which was informally used in the introduction.
Let us now show how to infer conclusions from a belief
base. We first need the following notation that will prove
convenient: mc(K, α) = {Ki ⊆ K | Ki ∪ {α} ∈ mc(K ∪ {α})}.
Definition 10 (Inference from subsets with best scores). Let
K be a belief base and α and β be two formulae. Let
s be a scoring function. We define mcscoresK,sum(K, α) =
{Ki ∈ mc(K, α) and there exists no K′i ∈ mc(K, α)
such that scoresK,sum(K
′
i) > score
s
K,sum(Ki)}. We say that
α |∼sK,sum β if and only if either α is inconsistent, or for every
Ki ∈ mcscoresK,sum(K, α) we have Ki ∪ {α} |= β.
4 Examples
Let us now illustrate the introduced notions by stepping back
to sport car example given in the introduction.
Example 1. We have #mc(K, ϕ1) = 4, #mc(K, ϕ2) = 1,
#mc(K, ϕ3) = 3, #mc(K, ϕ4) = 1, #mc(K, ϕ5) = 2,
#mc(K, ϕ6) = 2, so the score of K1 (resp. K2, K3, K4,
K5) w.r.t. score
#mc
K,sum is equal to 6 (resp. 6, 8, 8, 7). Hence,
the best sets are K3 and K4. Therefore, we have that
> |∼#mcK,sum e6c ∧ t ∧ ¬sc.
Hence, we conclude that the car has a 6-cylinder engine, a
turbo, and is not a sport car.
We obtain exactly the same result with #mus and miv, so
we do not give the details of the computation here. But let
us illustrate on the next example that the three inference rela-
tions based respectively on the scoring functions #mc, #mus,
and miv leads to distinct sets of consequences in the general
case.
Example 2. Let K = {ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4, ϕ5, ϕ6, ϕ7} with ϕ1 =
a ∧ b, ϕ2 = a ∧ (c ∨ d), ϕ3 = a ∧ ¬d, ϕ4 = a ∧ ¬c ∧ e,
ϕ5 = ¬a ∧ ¬b, ϕ6 = a ∧ (¬c→ ¬e), ϕ7 = a ∧ ¬c ∧ f
K has 9 minimal unsatisfiable subsets: M1 = {ϕ1, ϕ5},
M2 = {ϕ2, ϕ5}, M3 = {ϕ3, ϕ5}, M4 = {ϕ4, ϕ5},
M5 = {ϕ5, ϕ6}, M6 = {ϕ5, ϕ7}, M7 = {ϕ4, ϕ6}, M8 =
{ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ7}, M9 = {ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4}.
K has five maximal consistent subsets: K1 =
{ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ4, ϕ7}, K2 = {ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ6}, K3 =
{ϕ1, ϕ3, ϕ4, ϕ7}, K4 = {ϕ1, ϕ3, ϕ6, ϕ7}, K5 = {ϕ5}.
We have: #mc(K, ϕ1) = 4, #mc(K, ϕ2) = 2,
#mc(K, ϕ3) = 3, #mc(K, ϕ4) = 2, #mc(K, ϕ5) = 1,
#mc(K, ϕ6) = 2, #mc(K, ϕ7) = 3, so that the score of K1
(resp. K2, K3, K4, K5) w.r.t. score
#mc
K,sum is equal to 11
(resp. 11, 12, 12, 1). Hence, the best sets are K3 and K4.
Therefore, we have that > |∼#mcK,sum a ∧ b ∧ ¬c ∧ ¬d ∧ f .
Let us count the number of minimal unsatisfiable sets
containing a given formula; we have #mus(K, ϕ1) = 6,
#mus(K, ϕ2) = 4, #mus(K, ϕ3) = 4, #mus(K, ϕ4) = 4,
#mus(K, ϕ5) = 1, #mus(K, ϕ6) = 5, #mus(K, ϕ7) = 5, so
the score of K1 (resp. K2, K3, K4, K5) w.r.t. score
#mus
K,sum is
equal to 15 (resp. 19, 19, 20, 1). Hence, the best set is K4.
And we have> |∼#musK,sum a ∧ b ∧ ¬c ∧ ¬d ∧ ¬e ∧ f . Note that
we can also conclude ¬e, which was not the case using #mc.
Let us now show how to compute scores using a Shapley
inconsistency value. We have (rounded on two decimals):
miv(K, ϕ1) = 3.50, miv(K, ϕ2) = 2.83, miv(K, ϕ3) = 2.83,
miv(K, ϕ4) = 3.00, miv(K, ϕ5) = 1.00, miv(K, ϕ6) = 3.00,
miv(K, ϕ7) = 3.17, so the score of K1 (resp. K2, K3, K4,
K5) w.r.t. scoremivK,sum is equal to 12.50 (resp. 12.16, 12.50,
12.50, 1.00). Hence, three sets are selected: K1, K3, K4. So
we have > |∼mivK,sum a ∧ b ∧ ¬c ∧ f . This time, we are neither
able to conclude ¬d nor ¬e.
5 Logical Properties
Let us now formally evaluate the introduced methods w.r.t.
their logical rationality. There has been much work on the
issue of determining the minimum logical properties that
any nonmonotonic inference relation should satisfy [Gabbay,
1985; Makinson, 1994; Kraus et al., 1990; Lehmann and
Magidor, 1992]. There is now a wide consensus on the fact
that the minimal set of expected properties is the one of pref-
erential inference relations [Lehmann and Magidor, 1992]
(also called system P), and that an interesting subclass is the
one of rational inference relations [Kraus et al., 1990] (also
called system R).
Preferential inference relations are characterized by the fol-
lowing postulates:
Ref α |∼ α
LLE |=α↔β, α|∼γ
β|∼γ
RW |=α→β, γ|∼α
γ|∼β
Cut α∧β|∼γ, α|∼βα|∼γ
Or α|∼γ, β|∼γ
α∨β|∼γ
CM α|∼β, α|∼γ
α∧β|∼γ
A rational inference relation is a preferential relation that
also satisfies the RM (rational monotony) postulate:
RM α |6∼ ¬β α |∼ γ
α∧β |∼ γ
In this section, we show that the three inference relations
defined above, as well as many other from the same class that
we will formally define soon, satisfy the above postulates.
We start by generalizing the choice of the aggregation func-
tion. Previously, we considered sum in order to aggregate the
scores of the formulae, but many other aggregation functions
can be used instead.
Definition 11 (Aggregation function). ⊕ is an aggregation
function if for every positive integer n, for every non-negative
real number x1, . . . , xn, ⊕(x1, . . . , xn) is a non-negative
real number.
Definition 12 (Properties of aggregation function). An aggre-
gation function ⊕ satisfies:
• Composition if ⊕(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ (y1, . . . , yn) implies
⊕(x1, . . . , xn, z) ≤ (y1, . . . , yn, z)
• Decomposition if ⊕(x1, . . . , xn, z) ≤ (y1, . . . , yn, z)
implies ⊕(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ (y1, . . . , yn)
• Symmetry if for every permutation σ,⊕(x1, . . . , xn) =
⊕(σ(x1, . . . , xn))
• Monotonicity if for every z > 0 we have
⊕(x1, . . . , xn, z) > ⊕(x1, . . . , xn)
Composition, Decomposition and Symmetry were intro-
duced in [Konieczny et al., 2004]. We add here a new prop-
erty, Monotonicity, and slightly change Composition and De-
composition for dealing with tuples of different sizes.
Observe that sum satisfies the above conditions. An-
other well-known aggregation function satisfying the previ-
ous four properties is lexicographic aggregation [Konieczny
et al., 2004; Dubois et al., 1996; Moulin, 1988].
One can then define the score of any subset of the input
belief base:
Definition 13 (scoresK,⊕). Let s be a scoring function and ⊕
an aggregation function. Let K be a belief base and Ki ⊆ K
with Ki = {α1, . . . , αn}.We define
scoresK,⊕(Ki) = ⊕α∈Kis(K, α).
Based on those scores, one can compare the subsets of the
belief base:
Definition 14 (K,⊕). Let s be a scoring function and ⊕ an
aggregation function. Let K be a belief base, Ki, Kj ⊆ K.
We state that Ki sK,⊕ Kj if and only if scoresK,⊕(Ki) ≥
scoresK,⊕(Kj).
We will show that using a scoring function and an aggrega-
tion operator satisfying Composition, Decomposition, Sym-
metry and Monotonicity ensures to get a rational inference re-
lation. However, the result we obtained is in fact much more
general: it shows that selecting maximal consistent subsets of
the belief base using a monotonic selection relation is enough
for giving rise to a rational inference relation, whatever this
selection relation is induced or not from a scoring function.
Formally:
Definition 15 (Monotonic selection relation). Given a belief
base K, let K⊆ 2K × 2K be a reflexive, transitive and total
relation1 over the powerset of K. K is said to be a monotonic
selection relation if for every consistent set Ki ⊆ K, for every
non-trivial formula α ∈ K \ Ki, Ki ∪ {α} K Ki.
For instance, consider the relationcard that compares the
subsets of K based on their cardinality:
Definition 16 (card). For every two subsets Ki, Kj of K,
Ki card Kj if and only if |Ki| ≥ |Kj |.
Clearly enough, card satisfies the conditions from Defi-
nition 15, thus it is a monotonic selection relation.
On this ground, one can define a selection mechanism
which consists in keeping only the best sets with respect to
a monotonic selection relation:
1We use the standard notation Ki K Kj for Ki K Kj and
not(Kj K Ki).
Definition 17 (mcK ). Given a belief base K, a formula α ∈L, and a monotonic selection selection relation K, we de-
fine mcK(K,α) = {Ki ∈ mc(K, α) | there exists no K′i ∈
mc(K, α) such that K′i K Ki}.
We now show that all the scoring functions studied in this
paper induce monotonic selection relations. Formally, we
identify sufficient conditions under which a relation compar-
ing the maximal consistent subsets based on a scoring func-
tion is a monotonic selection relation.
Proposition 1. Let K be a belief base, ⊕ be an aggregation
function satisfying Composition, Decomposition, Symmetry
and Monotonicity and let s be any scoring function. sK,⊕ is
a monotonic selection relation.
Proof. Let Ki, Kj ⊆ K. Note that scoresK,⊕(Ki),
scoresK,⊕(Kj) are non-negative real numbers. Since Ki sK,⊕
Kj if and only if scoresK,⊕(Ki) ≥ scoresK,⊕(Kj) we conclude
that sK,⊕ is reflexive, transitive and total.
Let α ∈ K \ Ki be a non-trivial formula. Since ⊕ satis-
fies monotonicity, Ki ∪ {α} sK,⊕ Ki. Thus, sK,⊕ satisfies
monotonicity.
Let us now generalize Definition 10:
Definition 18 (Inference from best subsets wrt K). Given
a belief base K, two formulae α and β, and a monotonic se-
lection relation K, we state that α |∼mcKK β if and only if
either α is inconsistent, or for every Ki ∈ mcK(K,α) we
have Ki ∪ {α} |= β.
We can now present one of the main results of the paper:
Proposition 2. If K is a monotonic selection relation, then
|∼mcKK is rational.
Proof. Ref. If α is inconsistent, then the proof is trivial.
So let α be consistent. Then mc(K, α) 6= ∅. Consequently,
mcK(K, α) 6= ∅. Trivially, for every Ki ∈ mcK(K, α),
Ki ∪ α |= α.
LLE. Since α ↔ β, mc(K, α) = mc(K, β). Furthermore,
mcK(K, α) = mcK(K, β). We conclude that α |∼
mcK
K γ im-
plies β |∼mcKK γ.
RW. If γ is inconsistent, then the proof is immediate. Else,
let mcK(K, γ) = {K1, . . . , Kn}. From what we supposed, for
every Ki we have Ki ∪ {γ} |= α. Since |= α → β we have
Ki ∪ {γ} |= β.
Cut. The case when α is inconsistent is trivial. In the rest of
the proof we suppose that α is consistent. Since α |∼mcKK β, β
is consistent as well. Suppose α ∧ β |∼mcKK γ and α |∼mcKK β.
By means of contradiction, suppose α |6∼mcKK γ. This means
that there exists Ki ∈ mcK(K, α) s.t. Ki ∪ {α} 6|= γ. Observe
that Ki ∪ {α} |= β. Note that Ki ∪ {α ∧ β} is consistent and
that Ki ∪ {α ∧ β} 6|= γ. Hence, Ki /∈ mcK(K, α ∧ β). Let us
prove that there exists Km ∈ mcK(K, α ∧ β) s.t. Km K K′i.
Case 1: Ki ∈ mc(K, α ∧ β). Since Ki /∈ mcK(K, α ∧ β), there
exists Km ∈ mcK(K, α ∧ β) s.t. Km K Ki.
Case 2: Ki /∈ mc(K, α ∧ β). Let Kl ∈ mc(K, α ∧ β) be s.t.
Ki ⊆ Kl. SinceK is a monotonic selection relation, Kl K Ki.
Let Km ∈ mcK(K, α∧ β). Then, Km K Kl. From transitivity
of K, Km K Ki.
In both cases, there exists Km ∈ mcK(K, α ∧ β) s.t. Km K
Ki. Observe that Km ∪ {α} is consistent. Let us show that
Ki /∈ mcK(K, α).
Case 1: Km ∈ mc(K, α). Then Ki /∈ mcK(K, α).
Case 2: Km /∈ mc(K, α). Let Kn ∈ mc(K, α) be s.t. Km ( Kn.
Since K is a monotonic selection relation, Kn K Km K Ki.
In both cases Ki /∈ mcK(K, α). Contradiction. So it must be
that Ki ∪ {α} |= γ.
Or. The case when α ∨ β is inconsistent is trivial; in the
rest of the proof we suppose that α ∨ β is consistent. To-
wards a contradiction, let α |∼mcKK γ and β |∼
mcK
K γ and sup-
pose that α ∨ β |6∼mcK γ. Let Ki ∈ mcK(K, α ∨ β) be such that
Ki ∪ {α ∨ β} 6|= γ. Let m be a model of Ki, i.e. m |= Ki,
such that m 6|= γ. It must be m |= α or m |= β. Without
loss of generality, suppose m |= α. Observe that Ki ∪ {α} is
consistent.
Let us prove that Ki ∈ mc(K,α) by using reduction ad ab-
surdum. Thus, let us start by supposing that there exists
K′i ⊆ K such that K′i ∪ {α} is consistent and Ki ( K′i. Ob-
serve that K′i ∪ {α ∨ β} is consistent. Contradiction with
Ki ∈ mc(K, α ∨ β). Thus it must be that Ki ∈ mc(K, α).
Let us now show that Ki ∈ mcK(K, α). Again, towards a
contradiction, let us suppose that Ki /∈ mcK(K, α). Hence,
there exists K′i ∈ mc(K, α) such that K′i K K′i. Observe that
K′i ∪ {α ∨ β} is consistent (since K′i ∪ {α} is consistent and
α |= α∨ β). Let us show that there exists Km ∈ mc(K, α∨ β)
s.t. Km  Ki.
Case 1: K′i ∈ mc(K, α ∨ β) is obvious.
Case 2: K′i /∈ mc(K, α∨β). Then, there exists Kn ∈ mc(K, α∨
β) s.t. K′i ( Kn. Since K is a monotonic selection relation,
Kn K K′i K Ki.
In both cases, Ki /∈ mcK(K, α ∨ β). Contradiction; thus it
must be Ki ∈ mc(K, α). Observe that m |= Ki and m 6|= γ.
Thus, Ki 6|= γ. Consequently, α |6∼mcKK γ. Contradiction. So it
must be that α ∨ β |∼mcKK γ.
CM. We skip the trivial case when α ∧ β is inconsistent.
Suppose α |∼mcKK β and α |∼
mcK
K γ. Towards a contradic-
tion, suppose there exists Kj ∈ mcK(K, α ∧ β) such that
Kj ∪ {α ∧ β} 6|= γ. Observe that Kj ∪ {α} is consistent
and that Kj ∪ {α} 6|= γ. Thus, Kj /∈ mcK(K, α).
Let us prove that there exists Kl ∈ mcK(K, α) such that
Kl K Kj .
Case 1: Kj ∈ mc(K, α). Since Kj /∈ mcK(K, α), there exists
Kl ∈ mcK(K, α) such that Kl K Kj .
Case 2: Kj /∈ mcK(K, α). Like in the previous parts of the
proof, we show that there exists Kn ∈ mcK(K, α) such that
Kn K Kj . So we proved that there exists Kl ∈ mcK(K, α)
such that Kl K Kj .
Observe that Kl ∪ {α} |= β, thus Kl ∪ {α ∧ β} is consistent.
Let us show that Kl ∈ mc(K, α ∧ β). Towards a contradiction,
suppose that there exists Kp ∈ mc(K, α ∧ β) s.t. Kl ( Kp.
There must exist δ ∈ Kp \ Kl. Since Kp ∪ {α} is consistent
and Kl ( Kp, Kl /∈ mc(K, α), contradiction. So it must be that
Kl ∈ mc(K, α ∧ β). This means that Kj /∈ mcK(K, α ∧ β),
contradiction. Thus, for every Ks ∈ mcK(K, α ∧ β), Ks ∪
{α ∧ β} |= γ. Consequently, it holds that α ∧ β |∼mcKK γ.
RM. We skip the trivial case when α ∧ β is inconsis-
tent. Suppose α |∼mcKK γ and α |6∼
mcK
K ¬β and let us prove
α ∧ β |∼mcKK γ. Observe that for every Kl ∈ mc(K, α) we
have Kl ∈ mc(K, α ∧ β) if and only if Kl ∪ {α} 6|= ¬β.
Since α |6∼mcKK ¬β, there exists Ks ∈ mcK(K, α) such that
Ks ∪ {α} 6|= ¬β. Thus, Ks ∈ mc(K, α ∧ β).
Let us show that Ks ∈ mcK(K, α ∧ β). Towards a contra-
diction, let Kj ∈ mcK(K, α ∧ β) be s.t. Kj K Ks. Observe
that Kj ∪ {α} is consistent. Let us prove that there exists
Kl ∈ mc(K, α) such that Kl K Ks. If Kj ∈ mc(K, α), the
proof is over. Else, let Kn ∈ mc(K, α) be such that Kj ( Kn.
Since K is a monotonic selection relation, Kn K Kj . Thus
Kn K Ks. We conclude that Ks /∈ mcK(K, α). Contradiction.
So it must be Ks ∈ mcK(K, α ∧ β).
Let us prove that for every Kj ∈ mc(K, α ∧ β), if Kj 6|= γ
then Kj /∈ mcK(K, α∧β). Since α |∼mcKK γ, Kj /∈ mcK(K, α).
Since Kj ∪ {α} is consistent and K is a monotonic selection
relation, by using a similar reasoning as before, we obtain
that Ks K Kj . Hence, Kj /∈ mcK(K, α ∧ β). This means that
α ∧ β |∼mcKK γ.
As a corollary, we get that:
Corollary 1. Let K be a belief base, ⊕ an aggregation
operator satisfying Composition, Decomposition, Symmetry
and Monotonocity and let s be any scoring function. Then
|∼mc
s
K,⊕
K is rational.
6 A Characterization Result
We have shown that for each belief base K and each mono-
tonic selection relation K, |∼mcKK is rational. We now show
the converse implication, namely, that for each rational rela-
tion |∼, there exists a belief base K and a monotonic selection
relation K such that |∼mcKK = |∼. More formally:
Proposition 3. For every rational relation |∼ defined on a
logical language L built over a finite set V of propositional
variables, there exists a belief base K ⊆ L and a monotonic
selection relation K such that |∼mcKK = |∼.
Proof. Let V = {x1, . . . , xn}. Since |∼ is a rational relation,
we know from Theorem 5 by Lehmann and Magidor (1992)
that there exists a ranked model W = 〈V, l,≺〉 defining this
relation. Let K = {w1, . . . , w2n} be the base composed of all
corresponding complete formulae, i.e.,
w1 = ¬x1 ∧ ¬x2 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬xn
w2 = ¬x1 ∧ ¬x2 ∧ . . . ∧ xn
. . .
w2n = x1 ∧ x2 ∧ . . . ∧ xn.
Let f be a mapping f : K → V such that for every w ∈ K,
v = f(w) if and only if v ∈ V is a minimal with respect to ≺
state such that l(v) |= w.
Let us now define the relation K⊆ 2K × 2K. Let Ki, Kj ⊆
K. If |Ki| > |Kj |, let Ki K Kj . If |Ki| = |Kj | 6= 1, let
Ki K Kj and Kj K Ki. If |Ki| = |Kj | = 1, we proceed
as follows. Let Ki = {w′} and Kj = {w′′}. Let v′ = f(w′)
and v′′ = f(w′′). If v′ ≺ v′′, let Ki K Kj . If v′′ ≺ v′,
let Kj K Ki. Else, it must be that the two states are equally
preferred. Let Ki K Kj and Kj K Ki. It is obvious that K
is a monotonic selection relation. Also α |∼ β if and only if
α |∼W β, where |∼W is the relation defined by W [Lehmann
and Magidor, 1992]. Also, it is immediate to see that α |∼W β
if and only if α |∼mcKK β, which concludes the proof.
Putting the last two results together, we obtain a new rep-
resentation theorem for rational inference relations:
Theorem 1. A relation |∼ is rational if and only if there exists
a belief base K and a monotonic selection relation K such
that |∼mcKK = |∼.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have pointed out a new family of inference
relations from inconsistent belief bases based on the selec-
tion of maximal consistent subsets. This selection leads to
inference relations with a stronger inferential power than the
basic relation based on all maximal consistent subsets. We
have provided examples of inference relations from this fam-
ily which preserve more consequences than the basic relation.
The selection process must obey some principles to ensure
that it gives rise to an inference relation which is preferential.
We have defined a general class of monotonic selection rela-
tions for comparing maximal consistent sets that ensures this
property. It turns out that this class corresponds precisely to
the class of rational inference relations. Thus, we have ob-
tained a new representation theorem for the class of rational
inference relations in terms of deduction from (selections of)
maximal consistent subsets.
The work presented in this paper is related to a number
of approaches where inference is defined from maximal sub-
sets of defaults (see e.g., [Reiter, 1980; Poole, 1988; Makin-
son, 2005]). Some propositions reported by Ga¨rdenfors and
Makinson (1994) are quite close to results presented in this
paper. Indeed, one can find several characterization results for
nonmonotonic inference operators based on selection func-
tions over maximal consistent subsets in their paper (see also
[Freund, 1998] for related results on the links between exten-
sions and preferential inference). The work by Ga¨rdenfors
and Makinson (1994) nevertheless departs from our own one
from several aspects. Thus, while we focus on finite classi-
cal propositional logic, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson considered
more general logical systems. Their representation theorem
for rational inference also requires the base to be consistent
and deductively closed, while in our approach, the base is fi-
nite, so it is not deductively closed, and it can be inconsistent.
A perspective for further research consists in determining
the extent to which our results can be lifted from the flat case
to the prioritized case. Indeed, though only few inference
principles have been defined so far for dealing with incon-
sistent, flat bases K (as advocated in the introduction), there
has been an abundant literature about the design of infer-
ence relations from preferred subbases of K, where the pref-
erence relation is induced from a plausibility ordering over
the formulae in K (see e.g., [Brewka, 1989; Nebel, 1991;
Benferhat et al., 1998]). It would be interesting to study
how to combine the selection principles at work in such ap-
proaches with monotonic selection relations to give rise to
new rational inference relations in the prioritized case.
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